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Compensating Damage Arising from
Global Nuclear Accidents: The
Chernobyl Situation
"The unleashed power of the atom has changed everything save our
modes of thinking, and we thus drift toward unparalleled
catastrophes."
Albert Einstein'
I. INTRODUCTION
In the wake of the near meltdown at the Chernobyl nuclear
power plant in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics ("Soviet
Union"), a new kind of industrial accident was born. The Chernobyl
accident is the first nuclear power plant disaster in which widespread
nuclear contamination occurred on a global scale. Chernobyl illus-
trates the danger of "global disasters" which will inevitably arise as a
consequence of large scale industrial activity.
As Chernobyl is the first nuclear accident of its kind, where dam-
age caused by escaping radioactivity crossed transnational bounda-
ries, the procedure used in rectifying the resulting damage will set the
stage for future damage determinations and compensation. Other nu-
clear power accidents have occurred, such as the accidents at Wind-
scale and Three Mile Island. At Windscale, a fire in the plutonium
reactor spewed radioactive iodine into the air near the Irish sea for
three days.2 All of the resulting damage was confined to the general
1. Chaze, Chernobyl's Fiery Story Emerges, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., May 19, 1986,
at 23. Currently, there are 390 nuclear reactors in operation throughout the world. Id. at 20.
All told, 15% of the world's electricity is generated by nuclear power. Id.
Country Reactors Share Country Reactors Share
in Service of power in service of power
France 39 65% Belgium 6 60%
Taiwan 6 59% Sweden 10 42%
Switzerland 6 40% Finland 4 38%
Bulgaria 4 32% West Germany 20 31%
Japan 32 25% Hungary 2 25%
Spain 7 24% Argentina 2 23%
Britian 32 19% South Korea 3 18%
United States 101 16% Czechoslovakia 1 15%
Canada 15 13% U.S.S.R. 50 11%
East Germany 5 11%
2. Trafford & Wellborn, Stark Fallout from Chernobyl, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP.,
May 12, 1986, at 20. Approximately 39 cancer cases were eventually traced to the October
1957, Windscale accident. Id.
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area surrounding the reactor.3 At Three Mile Island, a partial nuclear
meltdown occurred. 4 Once again, the scale of the accident was mini-
mal and the damage limited to the immediate area surrounding the
nuclear plant. Chernobyl is a unique situation because it is the first
nuclear accident to transgress national boundaries and cause damage
on an international scale. 5
This Comment will address the issue of who should pay the cost
when a nuclear plant accident occurs, resulting in damage and de-
struction on a global scale. By analogizing to past transboundary in-
dustrial accidents, such as nuclear satellite collisions with the Earth,
this Comment will analyze the various approaches to the civil liability
issue arising from Chernobyl. First, this Comment will examine ex-
isting agreements and treaties concerning nuclear damage and dam-
age caused by space objects. Second, this Comment will give a brief
overview of each agreement and analyze each in terms of how it ap-
plies to the Chernobyl situation. Third, this Comment will propose
additions and alterations to existing, yet dormant treaty agreements.
Finally, this Comment will propose a way to redress the damage
caused by radiation contamination.
Reliance on modern nuclear technology has its costs. 6 Yet soci-
ety has accepted these risks in exchange for the gained benefits of nu-
clear power. 7 In the United States, the economic market has shown a
preference towards greater safety precautions. Even though a nuclear
plant accident might be worrisome to the community, the accident is
likely to be financially disastrous to the utility company.8 This choice
does not apply when the entity causing the damage does not have to
worry about being driven into bankruptcy proceedings due to its own
negligence, as is the case with a governmental entity. The difference
in the Chernobyl situation is that there is no current active interna-
3. Id.
4. Id. The accident at Three Mile Island, a General Public Utilities plant located near
Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, was the worst U.S. nuclear accident to occur. No actual deaths
were attributed to the accident and damage was highly localized. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id. at 21. Harvard University physicist Richard Wilson warns, "[w]ith 300 big reac-
tors in place around the world, we'll average a meltdown every 30 years." Id.
7. See Huber, Safety and the Second Best: The Hazards of Public Risk Management In
The Courts, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 277 (1985); see also Cohen, Innovation and Atomic Energy:
Nuclear Power Regulation, 1966-Present, 43 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 67 (1979); Bazelon,
Science and Uncertainty: A Jurist's View, 5 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 209 (1981).
8. See Huber, supra note 7, at 298; see e.g., Starr & Whipple, Coping with Nuclear Power
Risks the Electric Utility Incentives, 23 NUCLEAR SAFETY, Jan.-Feb. 1982, at 1, 64.
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tional treaty for the adjudication of damage flowing from nuclear
power accidents which affect countries other than the one in which
the accident occurs. This Comment will not debate the pros and cons
of nuclear power. It will address the practical problem of damage
rectification which has arisen from the nuclear accident at Chernobyl.
II. THE CHERNOBYL MELTDOWN
A. Facts
The accident at Chernobyl's No. 4 reactor occurred while the
reactor was shut down for repairs on April 26, 1986.9 According to
Soviet officials, a series of explosions occurred, most likely touched off
by a malfunctioning turbine and an electrical failure.10 The resulting
fire spread to the equipment, and then to the reactor itself.II The ex-
plosion blew the top off the reactor and spread a cloud of radioactive
residue across the Soviet Union, as well as across much of Europe.1 2
It was not until May 8, 1986 that foreign reporters were allowed to
visit Kiev which is eighty miles from Chernobyl.1 3 On May 9, four-
teen days after the accident, the Soviet government finally agreed to
supply daily radiation measurements, wind reports, and other meteor-
ological information to the International Atomic Energy Agency.' 4
Soviet officials have officially attributed the accident to human error. 5
As a direct result of the accident, countries from around the
world have called for international agreements to determine a stan-
dard for handling such crises.1 6 The British Minister of Energy, Peter
9. For a detailed explanation of the official Soviet version of the accident, see U.S.S.R.
State Committee on the Utilization of Atomic Energy, The Accident at the Chernobyl Nuclear
Power Plant and Its Consequences, at 15 (1986), reprinted in, Patterson, Chernobyl - the Official
Story, 43 BULL. ATOM. SC., Aug. - Sept. 1986 at 34-36.
10. Thompson, What Happened at Reactor Four, 43 BULL. ATOM. Sci., Aug. - Sept.
1986 at 26-31 (detailed description of the accident in technical terms).
11. Chaze, supra note 1, at 23. It is estimated that the fire in the reactor's graphite core
burnt at approximately 4,000 degrees Fahrenheit. Id.
12. Id. Among the nations directly affected by the radioactive waste released by the
Chernobyl accident were, the Netherlands, Finland, Italy, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, Po-
land and Hungary. It is estimated that the amount of radiation detected in Sweden was 15
times the normal amount, 4 times greater in Switzerland and twice as great in Italy. Nations
affected economically by contaminated food included Canada, West Germany and many other
nations who import food from the Soviet Union. Malaysia refused to take delivery of 100,000
pounds of butter from the Netherlands on the ground that it was excessively contaminated
with cesium 137. See L.A. Times, Oct. 6, 1986, part I, at 12, col. 3.
13. See Chaze, supra note 1, at 25.
14. Id.
15. Trafford & Wellborn, supra note 2, at 18.
16. Among the nations calling for international compensation agreements have been
1988]
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Walker, was quoted by the International Atomic Energy Agency as
stating that "the British government is anxious to see a general system
of compensation in respect of nuclear accidents, and we would sup-
port a binding international regime to provide that compensation."' 17
B. Damage
The initial damage at Chernobyl was extensive. The official So-
viet death count was 31, with over 200 seriously injured.18 More in-
sidious than the immediate casualties was the creeping radioactivity
which spread across much of Europe without any kind of warning
from the Soviet Union. European governments were not prepared to
deal with the harmful effects of the radioactive fallout because the
Soviet Union failed to provide any warning or information concerning
the disaster for eight days. In the Soviet Union, an area the size of
Rhode Island is believed to have been contaminated.' 9 In Poland,
milk from grass-fed cows was banned.20  West Germany placed an
embargo on Soviet fruits and vegetables. 2' The damage caused by the
nuclear fallout is hard to estimate and is likely to linger indefinitely. 22
One indicator, the measure of "half-life, ' 23 shows that the radioactiv-
ity spread by Chernobyl will last as long as the half-life of radioactive
cesium 137, which is approximately thirty years.24 A report by Swe-
den's National Institute of Radiation Protection estimates that more
exposure to radiation resulted from Chernobyl than from all past nu-
clear tests combined. 25
Great Britian, West Germany, Austria, and Luxembourg. L.A. Times, Oct. 6, 1986, part I, at
12, col. 2-4.
17. Id.
18. L.A. Times, Sept. 27, 1986, pt. I, at 4, col. 4. Additionally, over 135,000 people were
evacuated from the general area of the accident site.
19. Trafford & Wellborn, supra note 2, at 18. Chernobyl is located about 80 miles from
Kiev in the heart of the Soviet wheat land. Approximately 47% of the Soviet Union's winter
wheat is grown there. Id. at 19.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. McCally, Hospital Number Six: A First-Hand Report, 43 BULL. ATOM. Scl. Aug.-
Sept. 1986 at 12. The time required for a radioactive element to lose fifty percent of its radio-
activity by decay is measured by half-life. See von Hippel & Cochran, Estimating Long-Term
Health Effects, 43 BULL. ATOM. Sci. Aug.-Sept. 1986 at 19.
23. McCally, supra note 22, at 12.
24. Id. at 19.
25. L.A. Times, Oct. 6, 1986, pt. I, at 12, col. 3. "[Cesium 137] has been found in quanti-
ties up to 20 times the cumulative deposition from all past nuclear tests." Id. Scientists at the
Lawrence Livermore Laboratory estimated that between one million and six million curies of
cesium 137 were released into the atmosphere. Id. at 28, col. 2. A curie is defined as the rate
244 [Vol. 10:241
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The immediate damages resulting from the dispersal of radioac-
tive fallout ranged from the forced disposal of huge amounts of fresh
vegetables, milk and butter, to the slaughter of thousands of radioac-
tively contaminated sheep and reindeer. 26
Exposure to large amounts of radiation can result in death within
days or hours. 27 If the radioactive exposure is in smaller amounts it
can destroy the bone marrow which produces the white blood cells
that ward off infection. 28 Additional side effects include heightened
susceptibility to illness, nausea and sterility. 29 Intermediate health ef-
fects from radiation exposure potentially include the development of
radiation cataracts in the eyes, birth defects in children, and infertility
in both males and females.30 Long term effects will probably include
lengthy monitoring for radioactivity and increased cases of cancer
from the fallout.3 1 The total loss is estimated as running into the hun-
of disintegration of one gram of radium, which is 37 billion disintegrations per second. Mc-
Cally, supra note 22, at 12. It is estimated that the total radioactive release from Chernobyl is
near 50 million curies. This contrasts to the total amount of cesium 137 released from all past
atmospheric tests which is estimated to be between four and ten million curies. Id. The maxi-
mum permissible dose of radioactivity per year is 500 millirem (a thousandth of a rem). Id. A
rem is defined as "roentgen equivalent, man." Id. It is estimated that the 299 patients admit-
ted into Soviet hospitals following the accident were exposed to between 100 and 1,000 rads.
Id. at 10. A rad is defined as "radiation absorbed dose." One rad equals the amount of ioniz-
ing radiation that deposits 100 ergs of energy in each gram of exposed biological tissue. Id. at
12. For purposes of comparison, these examples are typical radiation doses:
a) Average annual natural background radiation: 90-100 millirem;
b) Average annual radiation from medical radiation or man-made radiation (i.e. diagnostic
X-rays, weapons testing, building materials): 90-100 millirem;
c) Cosmic radiation received during a transcontinental U.S. flight: 2.5 millirem;
d) Chest exam: 10 millirem. Id.
26. L.A. Times, supra note 25, at 12. Reindeer are the lifeblood of the Lapp economy.
The accident has been very traumatic for this fragile culture. Tor Gunneroed, the head of
research at Norway's Directorate for Nature Management has indicated that levels of radioac-
tivity in the primary food for reindeer, lichen, is estimated to increase to four to five times
above the current high levels. This could lead to mass deaths of reindeer, a regular part of the
Nordic diet, within the next two to three years. Id.
27. Abrams, How Radiation Victims Suffer, 43 BULL. ATOM. Sci. Aug.-Sept. 1986 at 13-
17.
28. Id. at 16.
29. Id. at 17.
30. Id.
31. Trafford & Wellborn, supra note 2, at 18. Exposure to smaller doses of radioactivity
may cause birth defects, and various cancers, including that of the bone marrow, breast and
thyroid. Id. at 19. Dr. Robert Gale, the United States physician who was called upon by the
Soviets to assist in the treatment of Chernobyl radiation victims, commented, "[that] upwards
of 100,000 individuals will face increased risks of cancer the rest of their lives." Wellborn, A
Soft-Talk, Tough-Talk Kremlin Defense, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., May 26, 1986, at 4.
Additionally, Dr. Gale has estimated that the radioactive fallout from Chernobyl would cause
Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L.J.
dreds of millions of dollars.32
C. The Soviet Response
The Soviet Union has balked at paying any compensation for the
Chernobyl incident. 33 It has claimed that the Western nations insti-
gated most of the problems by instituting "unnecessary" radioactive
monitoring and food restrictions. It has further argued that no inter-
national legal mechanism exists for determining liability from nuclear
accidents. 34 The Soviet Union, in a formal statement, suggested that a
multilateral agreement "could envisage the liability of states for inter-
national damage" but, that any such agreement would also have to
assign liability for "material, moral and political damage caused by
unwarranted action taken under the pretext of protection against the
consequences of nuclear accidents.
'35
III. EXISTING CONVENTIONS: THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON
CIVIL LIABILITY FOR NUCLEAR DAMAGE
The Soviet claim that no international legal mechanism exists to
settle damage claims is not altogether true. In May 1963, nations an-
ticipating future situations where civil liability for nuclear damage
would be an issue, met in Vienna to discuss setting a framework to
address the issue.
between 5,000 to 75,000 additional cancer related deaths. L.A. Times, Jan. 21, 1987, pt. I, at
5, col. 2. For an in-depth discussion of the effects of radiation poisoning in humans, see
Abrams, supra note 27, at 13-17. A number of sources provide supplemental reading on the
topic of physiological effects of radiation poisoning. See generally Hemplemann, Lisco, &
Hoffman, The Acute Radiation Syndrome: A Study of Nine Cases and a Review of the Problem,
36 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 279 (1952) (injury occurring as a result of uncontrolled chain
reaction); V. BOND, T. FLIEDNER, & J. ARCHAMBEAU, MAMMALIAN RADIATION LETHAL-
ITY, 57 (1965) (effect of radiation on cells and their reproductive cycle); Mole, The LD 50for
Uniform Low LET Irradiation of Man, 57 BRIT. J. RADIOLOGY 355 (1984) (discussion of the
amount of radiation exposure that will kill 50% of those exposed to it); Cronkite, Treatment of
Radiation Injuries, 118 MIL. MED. 328 (1956) (possible treatment of radiation exposure vic-
tims); von Hippel & Cochran, supra note 22, at 18-24 (in-depth evaluation of long term health
effects). A number of estimates have been made concerning the long term medical effects of
the Chernobyl disaster. Notably, 2,000-40,000 thyroid tumor cases from iodine 131 inhala-
tion, 10,000-250,000 potential thyroid tumor cases from iodine 131 absorbed via grass-cow-
milk route in absence of action by public officials to block this route, and 3,500-70,000 cancer
cases from whole body doses of cesium 137 (with approximately 50% being fatal). Id. at 24.
32. L.A. Times, Sept. 27, 1986, pt. I, at 4, col. 4.
33. L.A. Times, Oct. 6, 1986, pt. I, at 12, col. 4.
34. L.A. Times, Sept. 27, 1986, pt. I, at 4, col. 4.
35. L.A. Times, Oct. 6, 1986, pt. I, at 12, col. 4.
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A. Goals of the Convention
The Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage
(Vienna Convention) was held on May 19, 1963. The Convention was
attended by representatives of fifteen countries, 36 including the Soviet
Union. The purpose of the Convention was fivefold: (1) to review
problems relating to the Convention and to advise the Director Gen-
eral of the International Atomic Energy Agency of such problems;
(2) to study the feasibility of setting up an international compensation
fund for nuclear damage including ways to cover damage exceeding
the amount provided; (3) to study any problems arising from applying
the Convention to nuclear power plants operated by an intergovern-
mental organization; (4) to prepare documents for a revision confer-
ence to be held five years after the date the Convention enters into
force; and (5) to study the feasibility of establishing a procedure for
settling questions arising between two or more of the contracting par-
ties, with respect to whose courts will exercise jurisdiction.37
The Vienna Convention Conference was the first attempt by the
international community to solve the problems of allocating and re-
covering damages arising from nuclear accidents. As defined by the
Vienna Convention, "Nuclear Damage" is:
(1) loss of life, any personal injury or any loss of, or damage
to, property which arises out of or results from the radioactive
properties or a combination of radioactive properties with toxic,
explosive or other hazardous properties of nuclear fuel or radioac-
tive products or waste in, or of nuclear material coming from,
originating in, or sent to, a nuclear installation;38
(2) any other loss or damage so arising or resulting if and to
the extent that the law of the competent court so provides; 39 and
(3) if the law of the Installation State so provides, loss of life,
any personal injury or any loss of, or damage to property which
arises out of or results from other ionizing radiation emitted by any
other source of radiation inside a nuclear installation. 40
36. International Conventions on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage, series No. 4, at 6,
(1976) (hereinafter "Vienna Convention"]. The standing committee was formed composing
representatives from the governments of Argentina, Brazil, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Egypt,
the Federal Republic of Germany, Finland, France, India, Japan, the Philippines, Poland, the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Great Britian and Northern Ireland, and the United
States. Id.
37. Id. Resolution on the Establishment of a Standing Committee, at § l(a)-(e).
38. Id. at 8, art. I.
39. Id.
40. Id.
19881
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B. Damages
The concept of damages is of primary importance in determining
the extent and scope of Soviet liability from Chernobyl. United States
jurisprudence has established that damages are the amount of money
awarded to a person injured by another's tortious conduct a.4  The
wide variety of damage and injury suffered as a result of the radioac-
tivity released by Chernobyl falls within the concepts of direct, gen-
eral, foreseeable and compensatory damages. The four types of
damages enumerated by the Vienna Convention fall squarely within
the previously mentioned classifications.42 For a victim to be compen-
sated under general principles of tort law, a showing that the damage
or harm suffered was proximately caused by the reactor is required.4
3
C. Compensable Harm-Direct Damages
A further determination would be the types of damage or injury
compensable under the terms of the Vienna Convention. Direct dam-
ages are traditionally thought of as resulting from an act or incident
without the intervention of any intermediate controlling causes. 44 If
the requirements for causation are present and the harm had been
determined according to United States practices, the following types
of losses would be compensable: lost time and earnings, loss or im-
pairment of earning capacity, loss of property, impairment of use of
property through radiation contamination, loss of rents from lands
contaminated by fallout, loss of livestock, reasonable medical, hospi-
tal or nursing costs associated with radioactivity contamination, ac-
companying physical impairments and disease, pain and suffering,
reasonable costs associated with making property fit for use again,
reasonable costs associated with radiation cleanup, costs associated
with mitigating wrongful harm and reasonable costs associated with
41. W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 49-51 (4th ed., 1971).
42. See Vienna Convention, supra note 36, art. I, at 8.
43. Vienna Convention, supra note 36, art. II, at 8. Article II clearly specifies a direct
causation requirement. It states that the operator of a nuclear installation shall be liable for
nuclear damage upon proof that the damage was caused by a nuclear incident: 1) at the opera-
tor's nuclear installation; or 2) involving nuclear material coming from or originating from the
operator's nuclear installation. Id. at 8-9. The term "nuclear fuel" refers to any material
capable of producing energy by a self-sustaining chain reaction process of nuclear fission. Id.
at 7. The term "nuclear material" means either nuclear fuel, according to the above definition
or any other radioactive byproducts or waste. Id.
44. Christol, International Liability For Damage Caused By Space Objects, 74 AM. J.
INT'L L. 346, 360 (1980).
248 [Vol. 10:241
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the monitoring of radiation levels in the environment. 45 Direct losses
suffered as a result of the direct relationship between the actual acci-
dent and corresponding damage or injury are the easiest to ascertain,
but are not the only basis for recovery.
D. Compensable Harm-Indirect Damages
Another possible form of compensable damages would be indi-
rect damages. If it is determined that the fallout from Chernobyl
caused no measurable damage in the environment, then the cleanup
costs associated with the efforts to mitigate possible anticipated dam-
age might be treated as a form of indirect or consequential damages.
The Chernobyl situation would be analogous to the Cosmos 954
incident, 46 where the Soviet satellite Cosmos 954 prematurely reen-
tered the earth's atmosphere after the failure of its nuclear propulsion
system and crash landed in the Canadian tundra.47 The Canadian
government conducted an extensive clean up effort with the possibil-
ity that no actual measurable damage had occurred. In that situation,
it has been argued,48 "Canada's search and rescue costs were caused
by fulfilling its common law duty to mitigate probable damages and
that these costs would therefore qualify as indirect or consequential
damage in the sense of Article VII of the Outer Space Treaty. ' '49 The
costs incurred by Canada for the cleanup of radioactive debris from
Cosmos 954 were later partially settled with the Soviet Union, even
though no actual measurable damage occurred to the tundra.50
45. Id. at 359.
46. See infra text accompanying notes 104-106.
47. For a more detailed discussion of the accident, see infra text accompanying notes 104-
07.
48. Haanappel, Some Observations on the Crash of the Cosmos 954, 6 J. SPACE L. 147,
148 (1978) (emphasis in original).
49. Id.; see also The 1967 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the
Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, 18
U.S.T. 2410, T.I.A.S. No. 6347, 610 U.N.T.S. 205, reprinted in 6 I.L.M. 386 (1967) [hereinaf-
ter "Outer Space Treaty"] (entered into force for the United States on Oct. 10, 1967). Over 80
nations are party to the treaty, including the Soviet Union. The purpose of the treaty was to
govern the activities involved in the exploration and use of outer space, including the moon
and other celestial bodies, according to principles of international law, including the United
Nations Charter. The uses of space should be carried out in the interest of maintaining inter-
national peace, security and to promote international cooperation and understanding. See also
Christol, supra note 44, at 351 n. 17. For a further elaboration on the use of the Outer Space
Treaty in determining damages, see Galloway, Nuclear Powered Satellites. The U.S.S.R. Cos-
mos 954 and the Canadian Claim, 12 AKRON. L. REV. 401, 409-10 (1979).
50. Canada's total costs for cleaning up the Cosmos accident site were $13,970,143.66.
The Soviets were presented with a claim for $6,041,174.70 by the Canadian government, of
Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L.J.
This argument should also apply to a claim for the cleanup of
damages from Chernobyl, even if it is eventually determined that the
steps taken by Western European nations to cleanup and monitor af-
fected areas were unnecessary because no measurable damage oc-
curred. Any future claim made to the Soviet Union for damages
should include costs associated with cleanup of radioactive debris, re-
gardless of whether any actual measurable damage occurred.
E. Nominal Damages
Nuclear power inherently contains elements of both beneficial
use and great danger. Its inherently ultrahazardous nature means the
risk from possible mishap cannot be eliminated by the exercise of rea-
sonable care. For this reason, the Vienna Convention imposed a stan-
dard of absolute liability.51 The Vienna Convention, however, does
provide exceptions to liability in the event of nuclear damage occur-
ring as a result of acts of armed conflict, hostilities, civil war or insur-
rection. 52 Additionally, no liability attaches to the operator of a
nuclear plant when nuclear damage occurs as a result of a natural
disaster of exceptional character.
Under the Convention, the state where the accident occurs may
set a limit on the amount of liability. 53 One of the main drawbacks to
the Vienna Convention is the language stating, "[tihe liability of the
operator may be limited by the Installation State to not less than US
$5 million for any one nuclear incident."'5 4 This is a problem area for
two primary reasons. First, the five million dollar liability is unques-
tionably insufficient in terms of compensation, both in terms of prop-
erty damage and future health costs. 55 Second, the five million dollar
compensation floor is tied to the 1963 value of gold.5 6 Gold prices in
1963 were approximately $35 per troy ounce, while current gold
prices are nearly $500 per troy ounce. The Vienna Convention fur-
ther states, "[a]ny limits of liability which may be established pursu-
ant to this Article shall not include any interest or costs awarded by a
which the Soviets eventually paid a substantial portion. For a more detailed discussion of this
subject, see infra text accompanying notes 107-08.
51. Vienna Convention, supra note 36, art. IV, at 10.
52. Id.
53. Id. art. V, at 11.
54. Id.
55. L.A. Times, Sept. 27, 1986, pt. I, at 4, col. 1. Preliminary estimates of the damage
caused by Chernobyl indicate the loss of hundreds of millions of dollars.
56. Vienna Convention, supra note 36, art. V, at 11. Valuation of U.S. currency is set in
terms of the price of gold as of April 29, 1963. Id.
250 [Vol. 10:241
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court in actions for compensation of nuclear damage. 57
This provision does grant additional flexibility for compensation
but not nearly enough to provide for the potential loss caused by a
nuclear incident. Since liability is not limitless, as it is under the
Space Objects Agreement, 58 nominal damages may exist and should
be discussed during future negotiations with the Soviet Union.59
F Punitive Damages
Punitive damages are also not enumerated in the Vienna Conven-
tion. The purpose of the Vienna Convention is to provide compensa-
tion for people, nations or land damaged by the peaceful use of
nuclear power. Since neither nominal nor punitive damages serve this
purpose, they have no place in the Convention. 60 Another problem
with punitive damages is that they are usually not allowed in interna-
tional law unless it is determined they are generally available within
all major legal systems and can be applied by international tribunals.
In international law, punitive damages are rare and when plead,
are only reluctantly awarded. 61 In terms of international treaties, the
language of the treaty must be clear and unambiguous regarding the
allowance of both punitive and nominal damages. 62 For the most
part, international lawyers have, on occasion, contemplated making a
claim for punitive damages as a result of a breach of international
law.63 Acceptance of this concept, however, has been limited.64 For
the above reasons, punitive and nominal damages are highly unlikely
to be granted as a measure of compensating the Chernobyl damage.
57. Id.
58. 1972 Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects,
October 9, 1973, 24 U.S.T. 2389, T.I.A.S. 7762 [hereinafter "Space Objects Agreement"].
Over 60 nations are party to it, including the Soviet Union. See Christol, supra note 44, at 347
n.3. Article II provides that the launching State "shall be absolutely liable to pay compensa-
tion for damage caused by its space object on the surface of the earth or to aircraft in flight."
Id.
59. Christol, supra note 44, at 366. The rationale for nominal damages is that they serve
to confirm the existence of a right when there has been no substantial loss or injury. Id.
60. Id. See also Foster, The Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by
Space Objects, 10 CANADIAN Y.B. INT'L L. 137, 172 (1972).
61. See Christol, supra note 44, at 368.
62. Id.
63. G. HACKWORTH, 5 DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 723-26 (1943).
64. Id. See also Christol, supra note 44, at 368. For further information on the issue of
punitive damages, see M. WHITEMAN, 8 DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 813 (1967).
1988]
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G. Specialized Problems Relating To Nuclear Damage
There are three major problems with the compensation of nu-
clear damages under the Vienna Convention. First, many of the inju-
ries and other damages will not become known for a number of
years. 65 The Vienna Convention limits the time in which damages
may be sought to ten years from the occurrence of a nuclear acci-
dent.66 Yet, if under the laws of the Installation State,67 an operator is
covered by insurance or other financial security, rights of compensa-
tion may be extended if the State's coverage lasts longer than ten
years. 68 Under these provisions, most immediate and intermediate
damages are taken into account. However, the Vienna Convention
fails to provide for the long term medical damages, such as chromo-
somal damage and increased cases of cancer, which occur as a direct
result of exposure or ingestion of nuclear contaminated materials.
69
Any future agreement enacted to update the Vienna Convention
should include provisions dealing with the long term effects of expo-
sure to radioactivity. In the instant situation, the limitations of the
Vienna Convention limit the scope of Soviet liability to immediate
and intermediate damages and do not provide for the long term effects
of the accident.
The second problem is that the Vienna Convention only re-
mained in force for ten years from its inception. 70 At the end of that
period, a member of the Convention could terminate its application
upon serving the Director General of the International Atomic En-
ergy Agency with twelve months notice. 7' Unless notice of termina-
tion of membership is given, the Convention remains in force for five
more years. 72 After that, membership is renewed in successive five
year intervals until the member country gives notice of membership
termination. 73 The main problem with this clause is that the treaty
has neither been updated, nor applied before the Chernobyl accident.
65. See supra text accompanying notes 22-31.
66. Vienna Convention, supra note 36, art. VI, at 11.
67. "Installation State" in relation to nuclear installations refers to the Contracting Party
within whose territory that installation is situated or, if not situated within the territory of any
State, the Contracting Party by which or under the authority of which the nuclear installation
is operated. Id. art. I, at 7.
68. Id. art. VI, at 11.
69. See supra text accompanying notes 22-31.
70. Vienna Convention, supra note 36, art. XXV, at 15.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
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As a result, the Vienna Convention's primary use should be as a
framework for compensation claims to the Soviet Union.
Third, the Vienna Convention allows a nation to limit its liability
in operating nuclear power plants to five million dollars in gold, cal-
culated according to 1963 gold prices. 74 Even if this figure was up-
dated to the current price of gold, the amount of compensation
available to those injured by radioactivity released by the Chernobyl
nuclear power plant would be vastly insufficient. With damage esti-
mates running into the hundreds of millions of dollars,75 five million
dollars would be inadequate to compensate those suffering loss. Here,
as in the case of damage caused by space objects, liability should also
be unlimited 76 because nuclear power is a highly dangerous endeavor.
IV. FRAMEWORK FOR COMPENSATION
At the present time, no current treaty addresses the immediate
problem of compensation for nuclear accidents. Yet, the Vienna Con-
vention establishes the initial framework for compensation to nations
damaged by the radioactive fallout from nuclear plant accidents as
represented by Chernobyl. Such damaged nations should use the Vi-
enna Convention, international conferences, analogous international
treaties and case law to approach the problem and begin the initial
discussion of reparations with the Soviet Union.
77
A. International Conventions
Customary international law supports compensation for nuclear
74. Vienna Convention, supra note 36, art. V, at 11.
75. L.A. Times, Sept. 27, 1986, pt. I, at 4, col. 1.
76. See Christol, supra note 44, at 366. This treaty also exonerates a launching state for
"damage [that] has resulted either wholly or partially from gross negligence or from an act or
omission done with intent to cause damage on the part of a claimant State." Id.
77. A number of excellent sources exist for general background on the subject of compen-
sation for transboundary pollution. See generally Magraw, Transboundary Harm: The Inter-
national Law Commission's Study of "International Liability," 80 AM. J. INT'L L. 305 (1986);
Note, Compensating Private Parties for Transnational Pollution Injury, 58 ST. JOHN'S L. REV.
529 (1984); Teclaff, International Law and the Protection of the Oceans from Pollution, 40
FORDHAM L. REV. 529 (1972); Billingsley, Private Party Protection against Transnational Ra-
diation Pollution through Compulsory Arbitration: A Proposal, 14 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L.
339 (1982) (increased risk of pollution from radioactivity); Handl, Managing Nuclear Wastes:
The International Connection, 21 NAT. RESOURCES J. 267 (1981) (build up of nuclear waste
can affect world population); Davila, Air Pollution Control on the United States-Mexico Border:
International Considerations, 12 NAT. RESOURCES J. 545 (1972) (air pollution problem in
terms of transboundary effect); Note, Ixtoc I: International and Domestic Remedies for Trans-
boundary Pollution Injury, 49 FORDHAM L. REV. 404 (1980) (claim may be litigated in the
International Court of Justice).
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plant mishaps.78 The United Nations, through General Assembly
Resolution 2996, espoused the policy that States have "the responsi-
bility to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction and control do
not cause damage to the environment of other States or of areas be-
yond the limits of national jurisdiction. ' 79 The 1967 Treaty on Princi-
ples Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of
Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies8° sup-
ports the premise that States which cause damage to other States are
liable for acts committed within their own jurisdiction, especially
those acts committed with a high degree of state participation and
supervision. 81 By analogy, accidents releasing nuclear fallout are
within the category of high risk activities conducted by governmental
entities. This is the case in countries like the Soviet Union where the
nuclear power facility is a state run organization. International con-
ferences82 have further emphasized that States have "the responsibil-
ity to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction and control do not
cause damage to the environment of other states or to areas beyond
the limits of national jurisdiction.
'8 3
B. International Case Law
Support for claims of compensation may also be found in the
common law. International case law establishes the duty of States to
avoid causing damage to other States, persons and property.
In the Corfu Channel case, 84 the International Court of Justice
held that there is an obligation for every State to avoid knowingly
using its territory for acts contrary to the rights of other States.85 The
case stemmed from the large loss of life and property which occurred
78. This was confirmed by General Assembly Resolution 2996 (XXVII) of December 15,
1972, acknowledging the legal significance of Principle 21. The significance of the principle
was to lay down the ground rules which govern the responsibility of states to the international
arena in preserving and protecting the environment. 14 U.N. GAOR A/8730 at 278, U.N.
Doc. A/CONF 4816 (1972), reprinted in Christol, supra note 44, at 353.
79. Id.
80. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 49.
81. See STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON AERONAUTICAL AND SPACE SCIENCES, 92D
CONG., 2D SESS., REPORT ON CONVENTION ON INTERNATIONAL LIABILITY FOR DAMAGE
CAUSED BY SPACE OBJECTS, ANALYSIS AND BACKGROUND DATA 44 (Comm. Print 1972).
82. 1972 U.N. Conference on the Human Environment, Principle 21 (1972). This inter-
national principle was confirmed by General Assembly Resolution 2996 (XXVII) of December
15, 1972.
83. Id.; reprinted in Christol, supra note 44, at 353.
84. Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4 (Judgment of Apr. 9).
85. Id. at 22.
254 [Vol. 10:241
Compensating Damage
after the British ships Saumarez and Volage struck mines planted off
the Albanian coast. 86 In the Corfu Channel case, the main issue was
whether the mines which caused the damage were part of a mine field
laid with the knowledge or participation of the Albanian government.
The International Court of Justice found that Albania had an obliga-
tion to notify approaching ships of the dangerous condition.87 The
court held the Albanian government responsible under international
law for the explosions and for the resulting loss of life and damages.
88
A similar theory for finding culpability was espoused in the Trail
Smelter arbitration, 89 along with the duty to pay monetary damages
for identified harm to property. The case involved a large copper
smelter in Trail, British Columbia. Over a thirty year period, the
smelter emitted large quantities of sulfur into the atmosphere. This
pollution severely damaged agricultural property in Washington
State. The United States and Canada submitted the dispute to arbi-
tration after private attempts to resolve the problem failed. After the
arbitration commission completed its report, the United States re-
fused to adopt it. It took thirteen years before the victims were paid
approximately $350,000 in compensatory damages for the injuries suf-
fered as a result of the smelter emissions.
Further support for this principle is found in the Chorzow Fac-
tory case.90 In Chorzow Factory, international law was used to estab-
lish the principle that reparations for unlawful conduct "must, as far
as possible, wipe out all the consequences of the illegal act and reest-
ablish the situation which would, in all probability, have existed if
that act had not been committed." 9'
These cases must be taken into account in identifying the duty to
compensate under international law and in formulating the damages
arising from nuclear mishaps. They represent the recognition by the
international legal community of the responsibility of nations to avoid
accidents which cause damage to neighboring States. Further, they
represent the obligation of States to pay compensation to those in-
86. Id. The accident occurred October 22, 1946.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 23.
89. Trail Smelter (U.S. v. Can.), 3 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 1905 (1938 & 1941). For further
reading on the Trail Smelter case, see The Trail Smelter Dispute, 1 CAN. Y.B. INT'L L. 213,
215-29 (1963).
90. Case Concerning the Factory at Chorzow (Ger. v. Pol.), 1928 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 17
(Sept. 13).
91. Id. at 47. See also Christol, supra note 44, at 352, 358.
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jured by State activities which cause harm to persons and property.
International case law, international customary law and international
treaty agreements establish ample precedent for the right of the in-
jured nations of Northern Europe to present the Soviet Union with
damage claims. 92
C. Comparison Between U.S. and Soviet Tort Law
Another element in presenting a damage claim to the Soviet
Union is the determination of what standard of tort liability should be
used to calculate the Soviet Union's liability. According to the Amer-
ican Law Institute's Restatement, direct or compensatory damages in-
clude both general and special damages. 93 General damages include
loss of property and loss of use of property. Special damages, in a
personal injury context, include harm to earning capacity, expenses
for medical treatment and nursing care. 94 Additionally, U.S. tort law
also allows damages for non-pecuniary harm which includes fear,
anxiety, loss of companionship, loss of consortium, injury to feelings
and loss of freedom. 95 The tort law of the Soviet Union differs from
that of the United States in a number of ways.96 The Soviets pose
questions about compensation in terms of institutional costs, as op-
posed to personal individual loss. 97 Further, Soviet law concerning
ultra-hazardous activities states:
[o]rganizations and citizens whose activity is connected with an
increased danger for surrounding persons (transport organizations,
industrial enterprises, construction sites, owners of automobiles,
etc.) shall be obliged to compensate harm caused by a source of
increased danger unless they prove that the harm arose as a conse-
quence of insuperable force or intention of the victim.
98
This statement of Soviet law supports the ability of nations af-
92. In the case of space objects, over 4,700 such objects have been identified with only the
Cosmos 954 causing measurable monetary loss. Christol, supra note 44, at 350. Monetary
harm for which compensation should be paid pursuant to Article 12 of the Space Objects
Agreement is based on the duty of the international tortfeasor to "restore the person, natural
or juridical, State or international organization on whose behalf the claim is presented to the
condition which would have existed if the damage had not occurred." Id. at 350 n.14.
93. 4 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 904 (1979).
94. Id. See also Christol, supra note 44, at 364.
95. Christol, supra note 44, at 365.
96. For an in-depth treatment on the subject of Soviet tort law, see J. HAZARD, W. BUT-
LER & P. MAGGS, THE SOVIET LEGAL SYSTEM 440-59 (1977).
97. Hosenball, Space Law, Liability and Insurable Risks, 12 THE FORUM 141, 150
(1976).
98. J. HAZARD, W. BUTLER, & P. MAGGS, supra note 96, at 450.
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fected by radiation generated by the Chernobyl accident to make sup-
portable claims for compensation to the Soviets. As Soviet law places
the burden of proof on the nation engaging in the ultra-hazardous
activity to show insuperable force or the intentional misfeasance of
the victim, the claims of affected nations stand in a significantly
stronger position. Under Soviet law, the Soviets will only be able to
avoid liability by showing the interference of insuperable force99 or
the negligence'00 of those affected by radiation contamination.
Another difference is that under Soviet law, there is no differenti-
ation between "direct" and "indirect" harm. As a result, States faced
with the task of determining a legal standard to apply might look to
Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice to iden-
tify "the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations." 10'
It is only by identifying such general legal principles that the laws and
practices of different States become relevant. 102
V. THE CANADIAN-SOVIET SATELLITE INCIDENT: THE 1972
CONVENTION ON INTERNATIONAL LIABILITY FOR
DAMAGES CA USED BY SPA CE OBJECTS
Notwithstanding the Vienna Convention, the Soviets should be
held liable under the principle that the "polluter pays.' 10 3 In the win-
ter of 1978, Cosmos 954, a nuclear powered Soviet satellite' plunged
back through the earth's atmosphere, 10 5 crashed in Canada, and
99. E. JOHNSON, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE SOVIET LEGAL SYSTEM 166 (1969). The
concept of insuperable force is similar to the Roman concept of vis major, or Act of God. Id.
For additional explanation of the Soviet concept of damages for ultra-hazardous activity, see J.
HAZARD & I. SHAPIRO, THE SOVIET LEGAL SYSTEM Part III, 72-80 (1962).
100. J. HAZARD, W. BUTLER, & P. MAGGS, supra note 96, at 450.
101. Christol, supra note 44, at 365.
102. Id.
103. Statement by Walter Wallman, West German Minister for the Environment and Nu-
clear Safety, L.A. Times, Oct. 6, 1986, pt. I, at 12, col. 1.
104. See Galloway, supra note 49, at 401-02. The satellite was launched from the Soviet
Union in September, 1977. It was powered by a nuclear reactor fueled by 50 kilograms of
uranium enriched with isotope of uranium-235. Id. at 402; see also Krey, Leifer, Benson,
Dietz, Hendrikson & Coluzza, Atmospheric Burnup of the Cosmos-954 Reactor, 205 SCIENCE
583 (1979). For a further assessment of international law regarding space law agreements, see
Matte, Cosmos 954: Coexistence Pacifique et Vide Juridique, 3 ANNALS AIR & SPACE L. 483
(1978); see also Foster, supra note 60, at 137, 172.
105. Galloway, supra note 49, at 401. Cosmos 954 was launched into a temporary orbit
for three weeks and then was to be raised to a higher orbit where the radioactivity from it's
reactor could decay naturally over the next 600 years. Unfortunately, the satellite malfunc-
tioned and could not be sent into the higher orbit as planned. Because of the Earth's gravita-
tional pull, the satellite was drawn to Earth and resulting destruction. Id.
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strewed radioactive material across the tundra. 10 6 After months of
environmental cleanup efforts, 10 7 the Canadian government presented
the U.S.S.R. with a cleanup bill of $6 million (Canadian). 0 8
Canada based its claim in accordance with international law and
agreements, most notably the 1972 Convention on International Lia-
bility for Damages Caused by Space Objects, 0 9 to which both Canada
and the U.S.S.R. were signatories. 1 ° This agreement is similar in
purpose to the Vienna Conventions allocating the civil liability for
nuclear incidents."' It provides, in Article II, that the State launch-
ing the satellite "[is] absolutely liable to pay compensation for damage
106. Id. at 401. The Soviet satellite disintegrated over Canada at 11:53 a.m. Greenwich
Mean Time to the north of the Queen Charlotte Islands on the west coast of Canada. Debris
from the satellite was spread across Canada, including parts of the Northwest Territories,
Alberta and Saskatchewan. Gov't of Canada, Dep't of External Aff., Note from the Secretary
of State for External Aff. to the Soviet Ambassador, Jan. 23, 1979, Annex A: Statement of
Claim [hereinafter Annex A], at 1 (on file with the Yale J. Int'l L.).
107. The clean-up operation was called, "Operation Morning Light," with a cost of $14
million (Canadian currency) to the Canadians and a cost of $2-2.5 million to the United States.
Annex A, supra note 106, at 3. The exchange rate between Canadian and U.S. currency is
approximately U.S. $1/C $0.80.
108. Canada Presents Cosmos 954 Claim to U.S.S.R., Dept. of External Affairs, Ottowa,
Canada, No. 8, Jan. 23, 1979. See also U.N. Doc. A/A.C. 105/214 and 214/Corr. 1, Feb. 8,
1978; U.N. Doc. A/A.C. 105/217, Mar. 6, 1978; U.N. Doc. A/A.C. 105/236, Dec. 22, 1978.
The original cost of cleaning up the impact site from Cosmos 954 was $13,970,143.66. Can-
ada's claim to the U.S.S.R. was for $6,041,174.70, and later reduced to $6,026,083.56, repre-
senting the amount directly pertaining to the satellite debris and not including administrative
or other related expenses. See Christol, supra note 44, at 346-71. Canada also preserved its
right, without prejudice, to make future additional claims which were at that time unidentified.
Letter, Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs to the Ambassador of the Soviet Union
to Canada, File No. FLA-268, Jan. 23, 1979.
Canada also mentions costs associated with search and rescue operations "undertaken as
a consequence of the events giving rise to Canada's claim." Id. Canada further reserved its
right to "claim from the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics payment of
interest at an appropriate rate on the amount of compensation declared payable by a Claims
Commission, such interest to accrue from the date of the decision or award of the Claims
Commission." Id. at 908.
109. See, Space Objects Agreement, supra note 58. The Soviet Union is a signatory to the
treaty, as are about 60 other nations. The treaty entered into force for the United States on
October 9, 1973. The Canadians also relied upon these other international agreements and
treaties in makings its claim for compensation from the Soviet Union. Treaty on Principles
Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the
Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, Oct. 10, 1967, 18 U.S.T. 2410, T.I.A.S. No. 6347, 610
U.N.T.S. 205; Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts and the
Return of Objects Launched into Outer Space, Dec. 3, 1968, 19 U.S.T. 7570, T.I.A.S. No.
6592, 672 U.N.T.S. 119; Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space,
Sept. 15, 1976, 28 U.S.T. 695, T.I.A.S. No. 8480.
110. Space Objects Agreement, supra note 58.
Il. See supra text accompanying notes 36-40.
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caused by its space object on the surface of the earth or to aircraft in
flight."' "1 2 Absolute liability for the State responsible for the damag-
ing incident is also included in the Vienna Convention. 1 3 The main
reason for applying a standard of absolute liability is the recognition
by the Convention's signatories of the inherent high risk of damage
and loss should an accident occur.1 1
4
After initially refusing to pay, the Soviet Union later entered into
negotiations with Canada, and eventually agreed to pay three million
Canadian dollars in damages for the injury caused by the Cosmos 954
accident. 1 5 By entering into this agreement, the Soviets acted in con-
formity with established international law t16 and agreements 17 to ef-
fect compensation where nuclear accidents damage other nations.
Although Chernobyl is only the Soviet Union's second incident
causing nuclear damage to a foreign nation, the Soviet Union has now
established a precedent for payment of compensation for other nu-
clear incidents. If the countries of the world use technology of a type
that can cause damage on a global scale, they must be prepared to pay
the price when that technology fails, whether by mechanical or
human error, and causes damage on a global scale. Even though the
Soviets partly reimbursed the Canadians for their cleanup costs after
the satellite crash, this approach has not been adopted in the
Chernobyl situation.
112. Space Objects Agreement, supra note 58. It should be noted that a 1978 assessment
of Canada's position, observed that "[n]o physical or property damage had been suffered by
Canadian citizens." Christol, supra note 44, at 347. It was also discovered that the Canadian
environment suffered no measurable damage resulting from the nuclear debris from Cosmos
954. Id.
113. Vienna Convention, supra note 36, art. IV, at 10. Part I of this section specifically
states: "[T]he liability of the operator for nuclear damage under this Convention shall be
absolute."
114. It is essential that any meaningful future agreement should contain a "meaningful
statement as to the standards to be applied to evaluate losses suffered and the amount of com-
pensation to be paid." Christol, supra note 44, at 352. As far as money can ever go to com-
pensate the injured for loss, the ideal objective should be to restore the claimants to their prior
existing condition before the injury occurred. Id. See also Reis, Some Reflections on the Lia-
bility Convention for Outer Space, 6 J. SPACE L. 126 (1978); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 188 (1965).
115. L.A. Times, Oct. 6, 1986, pt. I, at 12, col. 1. The Soviets paid $3 million to Canada
"in full and final settlement of all matters connected with the disintegration of the Soviet
satellite 'Cosmos 954' in January 1978." Claims Protocol, Apr. 2, 1981, Canada-U.S.S.R.,
1981 Can. T.S. No. 8, art. 2.
116. Trail Smelter (U.S. v. Can.), 3 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 1905 (1938 & 1941), Chorzow
Factory, 1928 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 17, Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4 (Judgment
of Apr. 9).
117. See supra text accompanying note 109.
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There are a number of possible reasons why the Soviets have re-
fused to reimburse countries affected by the Chernobyl accident. One
possible reason is because of the much greater damage inflicted upon
the world by a nuclear accident of this proportion. In the present
case, the total damage caused by Cosmos 954 was approximately six-
teen million dollars.11 8 This pales in comparison to the hundreds of
millions of dollars of estimated damages which have occurred as a
result of the Chernobyl incident.11 9
Another reason may be that the damage which occurred to Can-
ada as a result of Cosmos 954 was fairly concentrated and easy to
ascertain. The damage in the Chernobyl incident, in contrast, was
spread over a much greater area. Additionally, the entire scope of the
Chernobyl damage may not become apparent for several years. Many
health problems caused by radiation exposure do not become manifest
for years.12 0 Accordingly, claims from a variety of parties, both na-
tions and individuals, will arise periodically over the next ten to
twenty years. To further complicate the compensation process, the
connection between health problems and radiation exposure from
Chernobyl will be attenuated and difficult to ascertain.
A third distinction between the Cosmos 954 incident and
Chernobyl is that the Cosmos 954 incident involved physical debris as
well as radiation contamination. The damage was confined to an eas-
ily identifiable area and enabled a fairly accurate rendering of actual
cleanup expenses. The Chernobyl damage, in contrast, was primarily
radiation orientated and damage caused by such radiation was spread
over a large area as a result of nuclear fallout. This may give rise to
serious questions on the part of the Soviet Union as to what claims for
damages are actually legitimate.
As a result, the Soviet Union is again refusing to compensate in-
jured parties. Perhaps the Soviet Union is attempting to set the stage
for negotiations as in the Canadian situation. So far, they have been
adamant in their refusal to pay for the damages caused by Chernobyl.
Only with repeated insistence will the Soviet Union concede to enter-
ing into any form of negotiations over their liability arising out of the
Chernobyl accident.
118. See supra notes 107-08, discussing the compensation claims of the Canadians result-
ing from Cosmos 954.
119. L.A. Times, Sept. 27, 1986, pt. I, at 4, col. 1.
120. See supra text accompanying notes 22-31.
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VI. ANALYSIS OF RELEVANT PORTIONS OF
THE VIENNA CONVENTION
A. Allocation of Liability
The Vienna Convention provides that the operator of a nuclear
installation shall be held liable for nuclear damage upon proof that
the accident occurred at his installation. 12' "Nuclear Installation" is
defined by the Vienna Convention as:
(i) any nuclear reactor other than one with which a means of sea or
air transport is equipped for use as a source of power, whether for
propulsion thereof or for any other purpose; (ii) any factory using
nuclear fuel for the production of nuclear material, or any factory
for the processing of nuclear material, including any factory for the
reprocessing of irradiated nuclear fuel; and (iii) any facility where
nuclear material is stored, other than storage incidental to the car-
riage of such material.' 2
2
By this definition, the Chernobyl installation clearly meets the re-
quirement of a nuclear installation.
The second part of the liability definition requires that the acci-
dent involve material originating from the operator's reactor or from
radioactive material being sent to the operator's nuclear installa-
tion. 123 The Chernobyl accident fulfilled this part of the liability re-
quirement as the accident involved the radioactive fuel of the
installation.
As the initial requirements for liability have been met, the next
question is whether the cause for the accident releases the Soviet
Union from liability. The Vienna Convention specifies in Article IV
that, "[n]o liability under this Convention shall attach to an operator
for nuclear damage caused by a nuclear incident directly due to an act
of armed conflict, hostilities, civil war, or insurrection." 24 A further
exception states that, "the operator shall not be liable for nuclear
damage caused by a nuclear incident directly due to a grave natural
disaster of an exceptional character."' 25 Without showing one of the
above mentioned exceptions, liability attaches to the operator state
causing the nuclear damage. In Chernobyl, the Soviet Union has not
121. Vienna Convention, supra note 36, at 8, art. II.
122. Id. at 8, art. 1(j).
123. Id.
124. Id. at 10, art. IV(3)(a).
125. Id. at (3)(b). The Vienna Convention also states that this clause is subject to any
contrary laws of the Installation State.
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attempted to attribute the cause of the accident to any of the excep-
tions. This further strengthens the claims of affected nations.
These requirements for liability have been fulfilled by the Soviet
Union. The accident occurred at one of their nuclear power installa-
tions, and has been attributed to human error. 126 Further, no extenu-
ating circumstances have been claimed. 27 Thus, if international law
and the Vienna Convention are to have any weight, the Soviet Union
must be held liable for damage resulting from the accident.
B. Extent of Liability
The next question is the extent to which the operator state is
considered liable for a nuclear accident. The Vienna Convention pro-
vides that the operator of the installation will not be responsible for
damage to the installation itself or any of the installation's prop-
erty. 28 Nor will it be liable for the transport on which the nuclear
material was involved at the time of the accident. 29 Further, the
Convention states that, "[w]here nuclear damage engages the liability
of more than one operator, the operators involved shall, in so far as
the damage attributable to each operator is not reasonably separable,
be jointly and severally liable."' 30 This provision was adopted to deal
with a situation where the nuclear damage occurred from the negli-
gence of more than one operator. 131 In such a case, each operator
would be jointly and severally liable for all damage which is not rea-
sonably severable from other operators.
32
Whenever more than one nuclear installation is involved, opera-
tors are liable up to the amount established by Article V; no less than
$5 million dollars in United States currency for any one nuclear acci-
dent. 133 The Vienna Convention does provide, under Article IV, that:
if the operator proves that the nuclear damage resulted wholly or
partly either from the gross negligence of the person suffering the
damage or from an act or omission of such person done with intent
to cause damage, the competent court may, if its law so provides,
relieve the operator wholly or partly from his obligation to pay
126. Trafford & Wellborn, supra note 2, at 18.
127. Id.
128. Vienna Convention, supra note 36, at 10, art. IV.
129. Id. at 11.
130. Id. art. II, at 9.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id. art. V, at 11.
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compensation in respect of the damage suffered by such person. ' 34
C. Statute of Limitations
The Vienna Convention requires all claims to be filed within ten
years from the date of the nuclear incident. 135 This attempts to ad-
dress the problem of lingering radioactive damage and provide for the
damage claims such as those arising from Chernobyl. It took almost
two years to determine the extent of Soviet damage in the Canadian
incident. 36 Even so, the Space Objects Agreement only allows a one
year period to submit damages measured from the time of the acci-
dent. There is, however, provision for an extension of the one year
limit to further ascertain damages caused by a falling satellite. 37
These time limits apply even if the full extent of the damage is not yet
known. 138
The time provisions of the Space Objects Agreement are impor-
tant in deciding liability for Chernobyl because of the similarity in
terms of nuclear damage. The ten year limit was imposed by the Vi-
enna Convention to limit the time a country may procrastinate in the
resolution of its damage claims. As most claims would be covered
under this period, only the most attenuated types of damage or loss
would remain uncompensated.139 This is a serious shortcoming of the
Vienna Convention, but one that is a necessary evil. A line must be
drawn somewhere, or else liability claims could be stretched out for
an indefinite period of time. As was discussed previously, 14° many of
the consequences of exposure to radioactivity will not be apparent for
years to come. Of primary concern, in human terms, are the in-
134. Id. art. IV, at 10.
135. Id. art. VI, at 11. In the case where the installation state has insurance or other
financial security covering liability for a period of time greater than ten years, the competent
court may provide that the rights of compensation against the operator of the nuclear plant
shall only end after a period longer than ten years, but shall not be longer than the period
under which the installation state's liability is covered under the state's laws. Id. However,
the extension of the extinction period does not affect the compensation rights of people bring-
ing claims for loss of life or personal injury against the plant operator before the expiration of
the ten year period. Id. Additionally, the state court may establish an extinction period not
less than three years from the date on which the person suffering from nuclear exposure had
knowledge or should have had knowledge of the damage caused to him so long as the period
does not exceed the ten year time limit. Id.
136. L.A. Times, Oct. 6, 1986 pt. I, at 12, col. 1.
137. Space Objects Agreement, supra note 58, art. X.
138. Id.
139. See supra text accompanying notes 22-31.
140. Id.
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creased risks of cancer, future birth defects, and a myriad of other
radiation related illnesses.1
4 1
D. Insurance
The Vienna Convention requires all participating nations to
maintain insurance covering the amount of liability that the Installa-
tion state shall specify. 142 Paragraph 1 states that, "[t]he operator
shall be required to maintain insurance or other financial security cov-
ering his liability for nuclear damage in such amount, of such type
and in such terms as the Installation State shall specify."'' 43 However,
in the next portion of the insurance section, the Convention seems to
change the mandatory insurance provision so as not to require a
member of the Convention to maintain insurance or other financial
security to cover his liability. 44 Specifically, the Vienna Convention
language reads, "[n]othing in paragraph 1 of this Article shall require
a Contracting Party or any of its constituent sub-divisions, such as
States or Republics, to maintain insurance or other financial security
to cover their liability as operators."'
145
This provision weakens the entire section so as to completely un-
dercut the effectiveness of requiring the maintenance of insurance.
There must be a way to compensate those injured by a nuclear acci-
dent. By realizing the inherent risk and possibility of damage from a
nuclear accident, nations can plan for compensation by requiring in-
surance in proportion to the number of reactors the country has oper-
ating. The cost is much greater when a nuclear accident occurs and a
nation must compensate property and other losses out of pocket if
insurance has not been required.
This huge cost would make sufficient compensation prohibitively
expensive. Any nation would attempt to avoid paying liability claims
in the hundreds of millions of dollars. Thus, by requiring sufficient
insurance to offset probable damage, the procedure would be in place
for handling future nuclear accidents. Unless nations can agree to a
method of dealing with the problem, there is no incentive to follow
141. Id.
142. Vienna Convention, supra note 36, art. VII, at 12.
143. Id.
144. Id. The section also addresses the situation where the damage caused exceeds the
amount of insurance. Any damage beyond the amount of insurance coverage and the five
million dollar compensation floor, pursuant to Article V, becomes the liability of the operator
state. Id.
145. Id.
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any kind of international treaties or conventions dealing with the is-
sue. As the Vienna Convention is the only readily available, multilat-
eral agreement pertaining to nuclear damage liability, it should be
given weight in approaching the Soviet Union with compensation
claims for the present situation. A treaty to compensate the injured
State benefits all operator countries. If the Soviet Union can shirk
their obligations to compensate here, how will the world enforce com-
pensation when nuclear accidents occur in the future?
E. Jurisdiction
The Vienna Convention provides that, "[e]xcept as otherwise
provided in this Article, jurisdiction over actions under Article II
shall lie only with the courts of the Contracting Party within whose
territory the nuclear incident occurs." 146 This provision gives the So-
viet Union an opportunity to act evenhandedly in the determination
of damages flowing from the Chernobyl accident. By allowing the
party causing the damage to litigate the issue in their own forum, the
members of the Vienna Convention avoid the situation of one country
imposing unfair compensation on another country. A final judgment
entered by the court having jurisdiction will be recognized within the
territory of any other contracting party unless the judgment was ob-
tained by fraud or the party against whom judgment is rendered did
not have a fair chance to present a case. 147 A judgment is also invalid
if it is contrary to the public policy in the territory where recognition
is sought and if it is not within fundamental traditions of justice. 148
The flaw in this clause is readily apparent. A judgment rendered
by a court of the Installation State would have to be quite extensive
after an incident such as Chernobyl. With damages estimated at hun-
dreds of millions of dollars, such a judgment might be against the
public policy of the Installation State simply due to the economic
ramifications of paying the judgment. This would render the possibil-
ity of judgment ineffective. The Vienna Convention provides that af-
ter judgment has been rendered, the judgment is final and not subject
to further discussion on the merits.149 In order to address this prob-
lem, members of the Convention should meet to specify allowable
damages for accidents in the future. Any discussion of damage appro-
146. Vienna Convention, supra note 36, art. XI, at 13.
147. Id. art. XII, at 13.
148. Id.
149. Id.
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priation should attempt to remedy specific immediate damage, such as
debris removal, purification of contaminated lands and aquatic bod-
ies, loss of livestock, loss of foodstuffs, and other related damage. 150 It
should also take into account some way to remedy the problems con-
nected with long term damage. 151 The Chernobyl decision will set the
precedent for all future nuclear accidents. Thus, its importance is ob-
vious. The most sensible approach would be to allow the Vienna Con-
vention, with its carefully chosen provisions, to govern the Chernobyl
situation.
VII. OPTIONAL PROTOCOL
An optional protocol was also enacted by the Vienna Convention
to deal with the compulsory settlement of disputes. Article I of the
Convention establishes compulsory jurisdiction to the International
Court of Justice. 152 An action may be brought before the Court by an
application to adjudicate the dispute by any party which is a party to
the Protocol. 5 3 As an alternative to the Court of Justice, within two
months after the concerned parties have been notified that a dispute
exists, the conflict may be brought to an arbitral tribunal. g54 After
this period expires, either party may bring the dispute before the
Court upon application. 155 Another option for concerned parties is to
form a conciliation procedure. 5 6 The commission must make its rec-
ommendations within five months after its appointment. 5 7 If the rec-
ommendations are not accepted by the parties to the dispute, any
party may bring an application to be heard before the Court. 158
VIII. PROPOSAL
As nations begin to compile their damage claims from the radio-
active effects of Chernobyl, they will have to look towards incidents
such as Canada's approach to the damage caused by the radioactivity
of Cosmos 954. Canada's Secretary of State for External Affairs
150. See supra text accompanying notes 13, 22-31.
151. See supra text accompanying notes 22-31.
152. Optional Protocol Concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes, series No. 4,
art. I, at 17 (1963).
153. Id.
154. Id. art. II, at 8.
155. Id.
156. Id. art. III, at 10.
157. Id.
158. Id.
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presented to the Soviet Ambassador a claim for compensation arising
from the damage caused by the Soviet satellite's intrusion into Cana-
dian airspace and territory. 59 Canada made its claim for compensa-
tion based on relevant international law,' 60 agreements' 6' and
primarily on the 1972 Convention on International Liability for Dam-
age Caused by Space Objects.' 62 Nations presenting claims for dam-
age arising from Chernobyl will have to make their claims based on
the similar foundation presented by the Vienna Convention. Under
Article II, the U.S.S.R. as the Installation State, would be liable for
damage which occurred at its nuclear installation. 63 This liability is
absolute under Article IV. '64 Special attention should be called to the
point that the high risk and degree of loss from a nuclear incident is
further reason to hold an Installation State subject to absolute liabil-
ity. 65 Nations planning on presenting compensation claims to the So-
viet Union should also reserve for themselves rights similar to those
reserved by the Canadians. These reservations should certainly in-
clude a right to make additional claims if more damage is discov-
ered.' 66 This is of particular importance to the Chernobyl situation,
considering the possibility of long term effects of radioactive
contamination. 67
The Vienna Convention provisions speak directly to the damage
incurred by Chernobyl. On further deliberations regarding
Chernobyl, these conventions should serve as a model for negotiations
between the U.S.S.R. and its radioactive-damaged neighbors. Just as
159. Galloway, supra note 49, at 413. Canada based its claim for damages on two theories.
First, that the intrusion of the satellite was considered a "harmful intrusion" and second, that
the impact of the satellite on Canadian territory was a violation of Canada's sovereignty. Id.
160. Trail Smelter (U.S. v. Can.), 3 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 1905 (1938 & 1941), Chorzow
Factory, 1928 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 17, Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4 (Judgment
of Apr. 9).
161. See supra text accompanying note 109.
162. Space Objects Agreement, supra note 58.
163. Vienna Convention, supra note 36, art. II, at 9. "Installation State" is defined as the
contracting party within whose territory the nuclear installation is situated or under whose
authority the installation is operated. Id. at 7.
164. Id. art. IV, at 10.
165. Galloway, supra note 49, at 413. Canada emphasized this point in regards to the
risks associated with space activities and noted that the high risk associated with such activities
should subject those engaging in such activities to absolute liability, should damage or injury
result.
166. Id. Canada also reserved the right to claim from the U.S.S.R. the total cost if a
Claims Commission is established and the right to claim interest at a reasonable rate from the
date of the Claims Commission's decision.
167. See supra text accompanying notes 22-31.
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the Space Objects Agreement was used as a framework to determine
compensation for the damage that occurred in Canada, the Vienna
Convention could serve a very useful function to allocate damages in
the present situation. A disaster like Chernobyl, in terms of both eco-
nomic and human costs, must be dealt with according to international
law and relevant international agreements. Only then can a valid
framework be developed which will deal with the present situation
and future occurrences which will inevitably occur as a result of the
industrial nations' decision to pursue nuclear power.
For the future, the signatory nations should reconvene to remedy
the deficient provisions of the Vienna Convention. Specifically, there
are a number of points which should be clarified during future Con-
vention meetings. First, the language in Article V which allows a na-
tion to set the amount of liability at its own option 168 should be
eliminated. In its place, new language should be inserted setting a
standard floor of liability for any nation engaging in the use of nuclear
power. Secondly, the valuation provisions of Article V169 must also
be updated to reflect the current value of gold and inflation. One so-
lution to this problem may be to tie the compensation amounts to the
spot price of gold and raise the liability floor accordingly. Third, the
language in Article I providing for the definition of nuclear damage
should be clarified to reflect the inherent long term health problems
associated with exposure to radiation.
170
Additionally, persons exposed to radiation from an accident like
Chernobyl should be required to reserve their right to present a claim
for possible anticipated health problems. This would help to prevent
the filing of claims which are either unrelated or remotely related to a
nuclear incident. Fourth, the issue of insurance should be more fully
explored. A requirement for maintaining a specified amount of liabil-
ity insurance may be considered to lessen the burden of compensation
when an accident occurs. However, associated costs may be prohibi-
tive and nations with advanced nuclear power programs may not
want to pay to cover the compensation costs of other countries with
less advanced programs. Lastly, jurisdiction over nuclear incidents
should be specified to reside with the International Court of Justice.
Any claims brought against a Convention member should be heard by
an impartial panel made up of members of the Convention. To pre-
168. Vienna Convention, supra note 36, art. V, at 11.
169. Id. art. V(3), at 11.
170. Id. art. I(k)(i)(ii)(iii), at 7.
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vent any claims of partiality, at least one panel member should be
from the country in which the subject nuclear accident occurred.
IX. CONCLUSION
The purpose of this Comment was to delineate the steps that par-
ties affected by the radiation from Chernobyl should take to present
claims to the Soviet Union for compensation. This Comment has ad-
dressed analogous treaties and their value in analyzing Chernobyl
compensation claims. Further, it has discussed relevant international
case law and its effect on adjudicating cases involving transboundary
harm. This Comment has analyzed the applicable international
treaty, the Vienna Convention and presented an analysis of the acci-
dent issues within the framework of the Convention. Although the
Vienna Convention does address the Chernobyl accident, there are
problems with its provisions. By revising the Vienna Convention to
address the problems mentioned within this Comment, the agreement
will be more succinct and have more universal applicability in ad-
dressing claims for damages.
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